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Using theory, case studies,andcross-country evidence, we investigate the factorsbehind
the concentration of a nation's urban population in a single city. High tariffs, high costs of
internal trade, and low levels of international trade increase the degree of concentration. Even
more clearly, politics (such as the degree of instability) determines urban primacy. Dictatorships
have central cities that am, on average, 50 percent larger than their democratic counterparts.
Using information about the timing of city growth, and a series of instruments, we conclude that
the predominant causality is from political factors to urban concentration, not from concentration
to political change.
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and NSER1. Introduction
Over35 percent of Argentina's population is concentrated in Buenos Aires, a city of 12 million
inhabitants. What is it about countries such as Argentina, Japan and Mexico that justifies their urban
concentration when the United States' largest city contains only 6 percent of its population? We investigate
the causes of urban primacy using evidence from a cross-section of 85 modem countries and fivecasestudies
(classical Rome, 1650 London, 1700 Edo, Buenos Aires in 1900 and Mexico City today). We find that
concentration in the nation's largest city falls with total population and with the share of labor employed in
agriculture. As predicted by ICrugman and Livas (19921, countries with high shares of trade in GDP, or low
tariff barriers (even holding trade levels constant), rarely have their population concentrated in a single city.
Urban centralization also falls with the development of transportation networks.
But political %rces. even more than economic factors, drive urban centralization: dictatorships cause
concentration in a single metropolis. Political instability also increases central city size.Figure 1
summarizes our findings that both political weakness and centralized power lead to centralized urban
populations. One interpretation of these results is that unstable regimes must cater to mobs near the center
of power and dictatorships freely exploit the wealth of the hinterland.
Our work has some significant predecessors: Wheaton and Shishido (19811 and Rosen and Resnick (1980)
show that urban concentration is negatively associated with the country's population. They also find that
concentration is first increasing and then decreasing in per capita GDP. Henderson 119861 and Wheatonand
Sbishido [19811 show across a small sample of countries that concentration of government expendituresand
non-federalist governments both lead to urban concentration.' Using data on Western European cities from
1000 to 1800 C.E., De Long and Shleifer (19931 demonstrate that urban growth (not urban concentration)
is the product of non-absolutist regimes that respect property rights.
Our next section presents our basic hypotheses. Section 111 describes the data and SectionIV presents the
results. Section V presents our case studies of megalopolises. Section VI concludes.
III. Alternative Theories of Urban Giants
In this section, we discuss three forces driving the concentration of urban population in a single city: trade
and commerce, industry, and government. We also set up our estimation strategy.
2.1. Trade and Commerce
Urban theoristsfromvon Thunen[1826]to Krugman [1991] have argued that when transportation is
expensive activities will group together to save on travel costs. This theory predicts that urban concentration
willbe higher when transportationis more costly.1 ICrugman and Livas [1992] use this idea to suggest a
link between protectionism and the growth of Mexico City. In their model, international firms supply the
main city and the hinterland equally well. Domestic firms pay lower transport costs when serving their own
location; domestic prices, net of travel, are lower where domestic firms are concentrated. When tariffs are
low, imported goods are a large part of consumption. Imports are not cheaper in the central city so workers
spread over space to save congestion costs. With protection, domestic suppliers cake over the market.
Prices, net of transport costs, are lower for domestic goods in the central city because firms locate in that
city. Workers then come to the city to pay lower prices for domestic goods.' This theory predicts that
protectionism generates larger central cities.
Of course free trade does not always decrease urban concentration. Among our case studies, London and
Buenos Aires are trade cities that grew through commerce. We can therefore test the Krugman and Livas's
hypothesis of a negative correlation between trade and concentration against an alternative hypothesis that
central cities have a comj,arative advantage in commerce and grow with the volume of trade.
2.2, Industry
Activities, such as agriculture, which depend on immobile natural resources will not be able to relocate
to reap the benefits from being in the capital. The extent to which an economy is agricultural thus limits
2the extent to which that economy can centralize In one location. This basic argument suggests that any
movement away fromagriculturewillraiseurban centralization, but when it Is also true that aggregate
demand is the linchpin of industrialization, as In Murphy, Shleifer and Vislmy (1989), then industrial growth
particularlyraisesthe benefits of concentrating population. Centralizing population lowers transport costs
and raises effective aggregate demand fix a fixed levelof GDP.If the level of demand is moreimportant
lbrthe growth of industry than&the growthof services ecause offixed costsin manufacturing),then
thegreaterdemand created byurban centralizationmaybetied to industrialexpansion.
Industrialization creates afarther Incentivefbr finns to congregate IfIndustrializationincreases the need
for physicalinfrastructureand infrastructure costs can be sharedby firmslocated in thesamecity.
Manufacturingmay also increase the needforintellectualspilloversthatare onlyavailable inthecentral city
(perhapsthosecausedbydiversity as inGlaeseraa!.(19921 orfrom access to thepoolofinternational
humancapital).Largecitiesalso allowfinnsto specializeina thinner rangeof products, asthey provide
larger marketsforthesespecialized products. Wetestthe positiverelationship between manufacturing and
concentrationpredictedbythe above theories againstanalternative hypothesis in which manufacturing only
affectsurbanization and not concentration.
2.3.Government and Politics
Politics affects urban concentration because spatial proximity topowerincreases political influence.
Political actors from revolutionaries in 1789 to lobbyists in 1994 have increased their clout by working in
the capital. Distance can lessen influence in many ways: (1) when influence comes from the threat of
violence, distance makes that violence less direct, (2) distance makes illegal political actions (e.g. bribes)
harder to conceal, (3) politicalagentsliving in the hinterland have less access to information and (4)distance
hurts communicationbetween politicalagentsandgovernment.Thepolitical power of thecapital's
populationshould inducethegovernmentto transfer resources to thecapitaland these transfers willattract
migrants.Rent-seekers coming tothe capitalmay alsoraisethecity'spopulation.'
SThe political power of the capital's residents is most important when governments (1) are weak and
respond easily to local pressure. (2) have large rents to dispense, and (3) do not respect the political rights
of the hinterland. Effect (1) predicts that instability will create urban concentration since buying off local
agitators is most important in susceptible regimes.Instability may also create concentration if weak
governments are unable or unwilling to protect life and property outside of the capital.Effects (2) and (3)
suggest that dictatorships will have more concentration since they are willing to ignore thewishes of the
politically weak hinterland. Dictators may also have more rents to dispense. We test the positive connection
of dictatorship and instability with urban concentration against an alternative hypothesis where dictatorship
and instability lead governments to protect themselves by moving the seat of power away from the central
city (and thus lessening concentration), or by controlling migration (as in Stalinist Russia or Communist
China) to disperse population across space.
2.3.1. A Model of Government and Politics
This model formally connects the type of political regime (dictatorships vs. democracy) and the degree
of political instability with the size of the central city. We examine the spatial structure of taxation chosen
by a government eating legal political pressure from the electorate and revolutionary political pressure from
mobs in the capital city. Our main results are that (I) more dictatorial regimes have higher taxes in the
hinterland (because dictators ignore the rights of the median voter who resides in the hinterland) and (2)
more unstable regimes lower taxes in the capital (because unstable regimes are vulnerable to agitation by
mobs near the seat of power). We divide each country into two locations: the main city and the
hinterland. Migration between locations is assumed to be costless. Total population in the country is
normalized to one. Wages In each location (including amenities, psychic income and income from household
production) are assumed to be locally declining in that location's population because of congestion. Taxes
are lump-sum and may vary across space.
The assumption of costless migration implies that after-tax wages will be equalized across locations, or
4nç(N)—r, =W2(l —N)—; (1)
where Nisthe population of the central city, TIisthe tax level (net of benefits) in region I (fbr 1=1,2),
where region 1 is the central city, and fl) Is location specific, continuously differentiable wage functions,
with W,<Odue tocongestion. Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (1) defines a population
function:
N—N(r2—r1) (2)
whereN'Q<O, fromW,Q<0.The population of the central city depends on the difference in the tax rates
across space.
The government takes (2) as given, and chooses r, and r, to maximize
(1—rR(r1)—eEfr)) V+11N(r2—T1) + 12(1 —Mr1—r,)) (3)
whereVisa parameter measuring the value of survival, and 1-rRft,)-eEft,) describes theprobability of
surviving to next period. rRfr,) is the probabilityofa violent, or illegal, revolt where risa shift parameter
capturing the propensity of the country to revolt or the level of instability. The probabilityof a revolt
starting and succeeding is assumed to be a function of the degree of exploitationin the central city (ri),
becausewe assume that only revolts in the capital can be successful.' eE(r) is the probabilityof a
successful legal, or electoral, change of government.' The election function is based on the taxes facing
the median voter (2aslong as we assume that 50 percent of the population live in the hinterland). e is a
shift parameter measuring the power of the electorate; low c's indicate dictatorship. In equation (3),the
government faces a trade-off between current rents and future survivalwhen choosing the levels of taxes in
each location.








We assume that the second orderconditionshold. Our interest here is how the difference betweenthe
taxrates (r, -r,.which determinesN,the size of the central city) respondstodemocracy (e) and
revolutionaryinstability(r).
Itis simple to show that the gap between exploitation of the hinterland and taxes in central city (I) falls
with the degree of democracy and (2) rises with the degree of instability. Essentially, instability makes it
more dangerous to tax the capital city, since the capital become more prone to violence. Taxing the
hinterland is a more expensive activity *,r the government when democracy has empowered those voters.
Since democracy and stability both lower the tax differences over space, they will also lower the central
city's population.
Itis also straightforward to prove that instability is & more important in democracies than in dictatorships
(i.e.d'N/drde<CJ). The intuition for this effect is that there are two forces limiting taxation of the
hinterland: (1) democracy, and (2) the movement of population in the hinterland to the capital. When
democracy is strong, the tax rate on the hinterland is initially low so new taxes on the hinterland (created
by more instability) will have a smaller migration effect than they would if the tax rate on the hinterland
were initially high.
2.4 Estimation Stratetv
Our empirical strategy is basically an estimation of equation (I), the indifference relationship across
locations. A larger urban population in a country will be assumed to indicate that features of that country
attract people to the central city. This Inference requires that there be some freedom to migrate and that
utility in each location is locally decreasing in the number of people in that location. Our regressions
actually assume an indifference relationship across locations where congestion effects are power functions
6(i.e.. wagesIn each locationare$ function of national characteristics times the population of that region
raisedtosome power). We thus estimate:
ln(N) =a+$1ln()+$2ln()+ES,1, (6)
where the i/sarenational characteristics that change the incentives to Live in different locations. Equation
(6) is justified by a model, but it also has intuitive appeal. This estimation can be interpreted as finding the
factors determining the size of the main city holding the population of the other urbanized areas and the
hinterland constant. By moving ln(N_)orln(N,)overto the other side of (6), one can think of this equation
as estimating the ratio of population in the central city to that of other urbanized areas, or the ratio of
population in the central city to non-urbanized population.
ilL-TheData
3.1. Constnictionof the Data Set
We collected the 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985 observations for 85 countries to make our data set. The list
of countries included in this sample is shown in the Appendix. The data on urbanization and population in
the main urban agglomeration come from the 1988 edition of the Prospectsof World Urbanization, which
has data for countries or areas with two million or more inhabitants in 1985.' We used the country's largest
city, not its capital, because the capital city is only appropriate for testing political theories. Ourchoice is
Irrelevant since 77 of the 85 large cities In our sample are capitals and no results change If we drop the non-
capital cities. The data on each county's land area were taken from the 1986 edition ofthe F4OProduction
YearbooE Dataon the share of the labor force outside of agriculture, nominal GDP measured in unitsof
national currency, and data on merchandise imports and exports are from the World Bank's WorldTables.
The share of the labor force outside of agriculture is defined as one minus the labor forcein farming,
forestry, hunting, and fishing as a pacentage of total labor force.
7Data on total population, political rights and Instability are from the Barro and Wolf 11989) database.
GDP numbers are compiled by Summers and Heston [1991). The Gastil index of political rights annually
ranks countries in seven categories according to a checklist of political rights. The data on political
instability measures the number of revolutions,coups or strikesper year in each country. The data on
Import duties and government expenditures on transportation and communications are from the flff's
Cowniment FThance Swilsiles.
Our basic sample has 85 countries, but we lose several observations in dealing with import duties and
government transportation expenditures. We used averages of the 1970, 1975,1980and 1985 observations
whenfeasible exceptthr the data directly taken from the Barro-WoIfdataset?
3.2. Descriotion of theData
The 1988 Prospects ofWorld Urbanlzo4onreports 100 urban agglomerations with 2 million or more
Inhabitants in1985 (comparedto 62 in1970). Thesecities account for 487 million inhabitants, wbich
represents 10 percent of the world's total populationand24percentof theworld'surban population.Of
those100 largest urban agglomerations, 40 are in the more developed regions of the world. In 1985, 46 of
them contained between 2 and 2.9 million persons, 24 containS between 3.0 and 4.9 million, and 30 had
more than S million inhabitants. In this last group, eleven agglomerations contained 10 million or more
persons, with 7 of them in the less developed regions of the world. During the 15-year period of 1970-85
that we analyze, agglomerations that in 1985 had 2 million or more inhabitants grew faster than the world's
total population. While large agglomerations in the developed world grew at an average of 1.0 percent per
year, their counterparts in the less developed world grew at an average rate of 3.3 percent per year.
Table I shows the five largest and five smallest main cities of the world first ranked by absolute population
and then ranked by share of their country's population. Ranking by either measure, three of the five largest
main cities in the world are in less developed countries. Ml of the smaller cities are in less developed
countries. The correlation between absolute population and share of country's population is far from perfect.
8Shanghai is one of the world's most populated main cities when ranked by its raw population and one oldie
world'steat populatedmain cities when ranked by its share of China's population. The southern cone of
South America seems particularly prone to urban concentration; three of the five most concentrated countries
in the world are there.
IV.- Results
Table II gives the means and standard deviations for the sample that we use in our regressions. Table
III shows the raw correlations of our variables. Higher levels of central city population were positively
associated with larger and more populated countries, high levels of per capita GOP, and high shares of the
labor thrce outsideofagriculture. Central city population is negatively correlated with the presence of
dictatorships,theshare of trade in GOP, and the share of government transportation and communication
expenditures inGDP. The growthrate ofmaincitypopulationIspositivelyassociated with dictatorships.
revolutionsandcoups,and high tariff barriers. The correlations also showa strongcorrelation between
trade and politicswhich createsthe possibility that tradeand politicaleffectsmight beconfused empirically.
We use the log of average population in the main city as the dependent variable in most of our regressions.
MI regressions include the same set of controls: a capital city dummy that takes a value oft if the main city
in question is a capital city and 0 otherwise, the log of average non-urbanized population, the log of average
urbanized populatioi outside of the main city, the log of average real per capita GDP, and the log of land
area. Unless otherwise specified, all of our regressions report OLS results,with standard errors based on
White's heteroskedasticlty-cOnsisteflt covarlance matrix In parenthese&'°
Regression (I) includes our standard set of controls and the share of the labor forceoutside of agriculture.
The regression explains 80 percent of the total variation in the dependent variable. In regression (1),the
capital city dummy is positive and significant. The coefficient ott this variableindicates that main cities are,
on average, 42 percent larger if they are also capital cities.This faa may mean that power attracts
9population, but It may also mean that capitals are located In larger cities. Bothpopulation controls also take
positivevalues, butonly the log of non-urbanized population is large and significant. This coefficient is
typically well below one so that urban areas grow with their countries but less than proportionately. The
coefficient on the log of land area is also positive and usually close to 0.12, implying that a 10 per cent
increase in the size of the country increases population in the main city by about 1.2 per cent. The size of
the country (holding population constant) is a decrease in population density which might mean an increase
in the transportation costs of supplying the hinterland. This result provides our first support for the Kruginan
hypothesis.
Our income control usually takes positive values, but the coefficient loses size and significance whenever
we also control for the share of labor outside of agriculture. The share of labor outside agriculture is meant
to capture the country's state of industrial development and the fraction of the population that is not tied to
natural resources." This last variable has a large and significant effect on the size of the main city. We
find that a I percent increase in the share of the labor force outside of agriculture increases the size of the
largest city by about 2.5 percent. The agriculture and GD? results both suggest that large cities require
sonic economic development.
Regression (2) adds the share of trade in GD? to our first regression. This variable is negatively related
to the size of the largest city. An increase of 10 percent in the share of trade in GDP leads to a reduction
of 6 percent in the size of the main city. Alternatively, a one standard deviation increase in the share of
trade in GD? reduces the size of the main city by about 13 percent. This result supports Krugtnan and
Livas' [1992J theory against the alternative hypothesis that big cities grow as a result of commerce and trade.
The third regression in Table IV shows our first political variable. This dictatorship dummy (hased on
Gastil's indexes of political rights) assigns a value of 1 to countries who do not protect of political rights.
Since our predictions about dictatorship occur because dictatorships ignore the political rights of their
citizens, this measure is good for our purposes. Adding this dictatorship dummy to our list of controls, we
find that dictatorships have main cities that are about 45 percent larger than those belonging to countries with
10non-dictatorial regimes? We deal with the possible endogeneity of the trade an4 dictatorship variables in
TablesVI and VII.
Regiondummies are generally excluded from our regressions because we want to include the information
contained In interregional variation, but to check robustness we include region dummies in regression (4).
Our three main variables of interest remain significant and large, although the coefficients on trade and
politics fall by about a quarter. The coefficient on the Latin American dummy is positive and indicates that
countries in this region have main cities that are 40 percent larger than those of other countries.
In regression (5) we add a second political variable to regression (4). The New Democracy dummy was
constructed using data from Banks (19731, which contains data fOr a wide cross-section of countries going
back to 1815. This variable takes a value of I if the country in question did not have a well functioning and
efficient Parliament at the time it became independent, but was democracy between 1970 and 1985." This
New Democracy Dummy is intended to capture the effect of political history on the size of the central city.
Regression (5) shows that among the democracies in our sample, those that were dictatorships in the past
have central cities that are 40 percent larger than those of countries that were always democracies.
The final regression in Table WIncludesthe average number of revolutions and coups as a regressor, and
an Interaction between this variable and the dictatorship dummy to the previous set of regressors. We find
that political instability substantially increases city size in democracies.In those regimes, one extra
revolution or coup per year increases the average size of the central city by 2.4 percent. In dictatorial
regimes political Instability does not change the main city size.
The first three regressions in Table V examine the trade-city size connection more closely. Regression
(7) includes a tariff variable: the ratio of import duties to total imports." We find that importduties do
indeed expand the size of the primary city. A one percent increase in the ratio of import duties to imports
raises the size of the central city by almost three percent. The import duty effect remains important when
we control fOr the quantity of trade and dictatorship in regressions (8) and (9)..
Regress Ion (10) includes the share of government expenditures spent on transportationand communications
11for a small subset of our sample (50 countries). A one percent increase in the share of ODP spent on
government transportation expenditures reduces main city size by 10 percent. This evidence supports
Krugmafl 119911: high internal transport costs create an Incentive for the concentration of economic activity
In space. Regression (ii)furtherexamines the role of transportation costs using the density of roads in 1970
(fromCanning and Pay [19931).The coefficienton the initial density of roads in the country is negative
(and the coefficient on government spending stays negative), further indicating that well developed transport
facilities lower the size of central cities; The last regression in Table V controls for possibly omitted
political effects and shows that the transportation expenditures are robust to controlling for political effects.
Tests for Causality
Like most ofourvariables, transport spending isendogenous.Similar caveats applytoour trade and
dictatorship variables. Concentration of population in a single city might give local finns a transport cost
advantage over foreign suppliers and thus lower the amount of foreign trade. Dictator's coups might be
easier in spatially concentrated countries
Toexaminethe results of Table IV more closely, Table VI reproduces regression (5), but allows for the
possibility that trade and the dictatorship dummy are endogenously determined. We use three sets of
instruments to examine how exogenous changes in the share of trade in GDP and the type of political regime
alter the size of the main city:
(1) Regional Political Characteristics: Following Ades and Chua (1993) we use the average number of
revolutions and coups in neighboring countries, the average number of per capita political assassinations in
neighboring countries, and a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the average Gastil index of political
rights in neighboring countries is higher than 3.
(2) Predetennined Political Characteristics: We use the 1960 value of an index of etluiolinguistic
fractionalization in the country (from TaylorandHudson 119721 as in Alesina and Rodrik (1993]), and a
dummy variable that takes a value of I if thecountrybecame independent after the end of World War fl.
12T
(3) Regional Infrastructure: we usetheaverage road densityinneighboringcountries (fromCanningand
Fay11993]).
Our Identifying assumptions are that these variables affect politics and trade but do not change urban
structure directly. We test these assumptions using a Wu-Hausman test of the overidentifying restrictions
for the system of equations and find that our assumptions pass these tests.
Regression (13) repeats regression (5) using our instrumental variables approach. The coefficient on the
dictatorship dummy remains significant and large. A one percent increase in the probability of having a
dictatorship increases the size of the central city by about 1.8 percent. The coefficient on the share of trade
in (3DP is negative and smaller than the estimates obtained with OLS. Regression (14) add to our list of
instruments the fitted valueS obtained from running a PROBIT for the Dictatorship Dummy and a TOBIT
for the Share of Trade on all the exogenous variables in the system. This specification improves the
precision of the first stage regression by improving the functional form. The coefficient on the dictatorship
dummynow fallstoa levelconsistent with our previous OLS estimates. The coefficient on trade, while
negativeandlarge, is still not estimated precisely.
Instrumental variables provide oneapproachto causality. Timing provides another approach. Thefirst
three regressions in Table VII examine causality using thecorrelation of initialvariables with later changes.
This test for causality is imperfrct, but at least we can see whether large central cities push countries into
dictatorship or whether dictatorships expand central cities. The timing of the relationship between country
variables and urban concentration shows what predates what Of not what causes what).
Regression (15) looks at the effect of the spatial distribution of population on the change in the share of
trade in GDP.We findno effect of main city size on trade growth. In regression (16), the dependent
variable becomes the dictatorship dummy for 1985, controlling for the dictatorship dummy In 1970. This
regression captures the effect of initial urban concentration on the probability of being a dictatorship in 1985,
conditional on being a dictatorship In 1970. We find no evidence for large central cities causing a switch
13to dictatorship or preventing a switch away from dictatorship. Regression (17) makes thegrowthrate of
population in the main city between 1970 and 1985 the dependent variable. The role of dictatorships here
iscritical:the presence of adictatorship increasedthe growth rate of population in the main city by 1.3
percent a year. Trade has a weak or nonexistent effect.
RegressIon (18) suggests that concentration in a single city also ha strong negative effects on growth.
A Ipercent increase In the share of total population living in the central city reduces the growth rate by 0.08
percent per year. Large cities generate rent seeking and instability, not long term economic growth.
The results of this section support the idea that dictatorship causes urban centralization. Tests based on
instrumental variables and on the timing of growth both indicate that dictatorship influences urban
development. Our evidence does not confirm any causal relationship between trade and city size.
VI. Short Case Studies
6.1. Rome. 50 B.C.
At it's height, Rome's population probably stood at over 1,000,000 inhabitants, or approximately 2 percent
of the Roman empire's population. Earlier cities had been large but none had never grown to one half that
size.'3 There is dispute over Rome's population. In this discussion we accept Garnsey's 119881 population
figures and his claim that 130-30 B.C.E., when Rome's population grew from 375,000 to 1,000,000, was
the period of Rome's greatest growth.1' During this time, five distinct political events directly and
indirectly increased the incentives to come to Rome: (I) the empire expanded into Gaul and the eastern
provinces of Asia, Bithynia, Pontus, Cilicia and Syria, (2) Pompey declared that all conquered land was the
property of the city's government, (3) the Gracchi's Sempronian law and then the Clodian law extended the
grain distribution to a large number of the citizens as long as they me to Rome, (4) Sulla extended the
Roman citizenship to all of the inhabitants of Italy, and (5) internecine warfare made the hinterland
Aindamentally unsafe. As a result of events (3) and (4), by 46 B.C.E. 320,000 people were in Rome
14receiving grain handouts.
The first two events mentioned above were the resultofsuccessful Roman military leadership, impressive
technology and the remarkable incentives (ranging from great wealth to control over the world's largest
empire) offered to reward military success. Events (3X5)arerelated to internal Roman weakness. The
traditional aristocracy was forced during this period, first by the Gracchis and later by popular uprisings,
to distribute grain more liberally to Roman citizens.'7 The expansion of citizenship throughout the Italian
peninsulawasthe result of the Roman failure (under the leadership of Gaius Marius) to reject the demands
ofthe Italianrebels in 90B.C.E., despite theserebels' defeat in the Social Wars. Weak governmental
controlover local mobsandstrong control over distant empires, enabled Roman mobstoextract rents
(indirectly viathe legions) fromdistant Egypt and Spain.TheRoman empire deliveredrentsnot just to the
Proconsulsof the territories but also to thegeneralpopulationofthe capital. Mostvisible ofall these rents
transferred from the conquered provinces to the masses of Rome were the circuses (and other games) which
cost fortunes to produce Intl were put on at their height more than 50 times per 'ear.
Eventually, Julius Caeser restored stability and reduced the grain distribution around 45 B.C.E. The
growth of Rome then began to slow. Rome's growth illustrates how an ability to extract from the hinterland
and an inability to quell revolts at borne, together lead towards overconcentration in the capital. Trade and
industry may bave helped Rome expand, but Rome's huge unemployment levels, the overwhelming size of
the stat&s bureaucracy and the massive wealth redistributions make it clear that Rome's size was, ultimately,
a result of governmental size and transfers. The timing of Rome's expansion suggests that liberal grain
distributions funded by foreign conquests fueled Rome's growth.
6.2. London 1670. A. D.
For almost 1200 years after Rome's disintegration in the fifth century C.E., Europe had only two cites
with 400,000 or more inhabitants: Byzantium, with a population of bdween 400,000 and 600,000 from
600-1000 C.E., and Cordoba with a population of approximately 400,000 in 1000 C.E. [Bairoch 1988J.
15The first strictly European metropolises to come close to 500,000 inhabitants were London and Paris around
1700. While the first British population census with data for London is In 1801 (giving London a population
of 960,000), Wrigley (19861 has earlier estimates that seem consistent with the numbers given by Bairoch,
Braudel and others. His estimates for London's population are 55,000 in 1520 (or 2.25 percent of England's
population), 200,000 in 1600 (or5percent) and 475,000 in 1670 (or 9.5 percent). London's population
continued to rise after 1670, and as a share of England's population it peaked at 11 percent in 1700."
While the rise of textile production In London in the late 16th century did coincide with the period of the
city's growth, London's rising control over these goods indicates more about the increasing importance of
trade than about any causal role played by textile technology. The rise in trade is one explanation of
London's growth. The late 16th century saw innovations in both internal and external trade. Kerridge
119881 argues that the ur-whS cart (a major innovation introduced in 1558) made transport much cheaper
within England and increased London's role as a center of internal commerce. International trade grew
because of military victories against the Spanish, improvement in shipping technology, the discovery of vast
new markets in Asia and the Americas and rising government support r trade. The London transport
industry also benefitted from the massive emigration to the New World [Borer 19771.
Some of the trade related factors were actually political. The ability of England to subdue Spain, the
emigration to British colonies, and large trade reflects in part political strength abroad. The allocation of
rents to local trade monopolies represents Stuart weakness at home. London's' growth was also closely
related to political factors such as the centralization of Tudor and Stuart power. Despite the unusual English
system of local justice, the centralization of military power and financial strength in the hands of Parliament
and the King in the city of London made England the European nation with the most centralized political
stnicture and the most control over its provinces (Brewer [19901).
Several Thdor monarchs (Henry VII, Henry VIII and Elizabeth I) were strong, but the Stuarts (James I
and Charles I), who ruled during the period of London's greatest growth, were England's most dictatorial
kings and had a particular disregard for the rights of the hinterland supposedly protected by parliament.
16Smart instability is also easily seen; Charles I lost his thrown and his head in the Civil War. As in our
model, these dictators responded to Instability by collecting more incomefrom theweak provincial areas and
relatively less from the dangerous capital. Examples of Stuart redistribution from provinces to capital
include James l's novel imposition of naval taxes (ship moneys) on the hinterland. James I also recreated
trade monopolies (which had been eliminated by Elizabeth I) and allocated them to the great London
merchants. Stuart mercantilisni can be seen as a policy enriching the capital's traders and producers at the
expense of the hinterland's consumers (Ekelund and Tollison 1981]. Instability also increasedLondon's size
because the mid-l7th century civil war made much of the hinterland unsafe. It is unclear if London's growTh
was more strongly based on trade or politics, but we believe that the evidence points to the importance of
both factors.
6.3. Edo. 1700 A. D.
While both Paris and London appeared like colossi upon the map of Europe in 1700, neither city was
nearly as big as the Asian capitals of China and Japan. Peking had reached a population of 600,000 by
1500, and was the largest city in the world until London surpassed it in 1830. Japan's capital, Edo (modem
Tokyo) was almost as large as Peking around 1700 in absolute terms and much larger when viewed relative
to Japan's much smaller population. Excluding military personnel. Edo's population lies between 500,000
(Sansom 19631 to I million (Seidensticker 1980J, or between 2 and 4 percent of Japan's population.The
high productivity of rice economies has been the traditional explanation of Asian urbanization,but while this
nutritional edge might explain urbanization in general, it does not explain its concentration in a single city.
The period of Edo's greatest growth was between 1380, when Edo was a castle surrounded by a village,
and 1700, when it became the second largest city in the world. Edo's growth derives from its establishment
as the Shogunal capital by Tokugawa leyasu. Ieyasu (along with OdoNobun4a and Hideyoshi) unified
Japan in the late 16th century. Over the 17th century, Ieyasu's descendantsamassed a monopoly of political
and economic power far beyond that of any European king. By 1690, the Shogun hadrice revenues of 14.68
17kob, approximately half of the country's produces and more than six times the Shogun's revenues In
1598." The Tokugawa shoguns stripped rival chieftains of their authority and limited the power of the
samurai (following the path of Hideyoshi and his great sword hunt). At the end of the civil war, 100,000
ronin(unemployedsoldiers) were left lordless; many of these were induced to come to the military capital.
The dalmyo(locallords) and the shogunate cut soldiers off from their local power bases and encouraged
samurai to take their feudal dues as annuities and move elsewhere (mainly to the capital (Sansom 1963J).
Despite the power of the Shogun, some instability (such as the Shimabara uprisingsof1638-39) remained
In the hinterland and further encouraged people to move to the safety of the capital.
There is some support for die Knigman-Livas trade hypothesis In the story of Edo. The Tokugawa
shoguns excluded Christians from Japan in 1638.loweredthe importance of foreign trade and thus damaged
Edo's rival, the international trade center of Nagasaki. Anti-commercial attitudes of the Baazfu (the
Shogunate) also limited the rise of Osaka (the leading commercial center). The anti-industrial bias of the
leadership further prevented any other cities growing from the development of local industries. Japan does
not display the Roman combination of strength abroad and weakness in the capital - the Shogunate was
strong everywhere. However, the sheer power of the central Japanese government created such a
disproportionate amount of employment, safety and wealth in Edo that It city became an urban giant.
6.4. Buenos Aires. 1900. A. D.
Latin American nations, such as Chile, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, are often heavily concentrated in their
central cities. The first of these Latin American urban giants was Buenos Aires. By 1914, Buenos Aires was
the largest urban agglomeration south of the Hudson river with 1.6 million inhabitants (20% of Argentina's
population). Although Buenos Aires had been growing for 250 years before 1887 (and has not stopped
during the 80 years since 1914), the 27 years between 1887 and 1914 mark the period when the city grew
most. Over those 25 years, the city grew by more than 1.1 million people (an increase of 265 percent).
Industry did not play a prominent role in the rise of Buenos Aires. In 1914, less then 15 percent of
18Argentine labor force was involved in manufacturing activities. The Argentine government displayed
hostility towards manufacturing and innovation(examplesInclude heavy tariffs on manufactured exports and
the absence of effective patent protection). By comparison, trade expanded heavily over this period. Total
exports rose 4(X) percent between 2887 and 1914 (measured in gold pesos, cattle or sheep). Approximately
20 percent of Argentina's population (and a much higher percentage of Buenos Aires' population) was
involved in commercial activities.
The growth of Buenos Aires came from Its role as a commercial center and from its role as a center for
migration. The city expanded with an almost even increase in native population and immigrants. The share
of immigrants (mostly of Italian and Spanish origin) in Buenos Aires' population was 52.4 percent in 1887
and 49.6 percent in 1914.From 1905 to1909, immigrants to Argentina, almost entirely passing through
Buenos Aires, totalled around I million. Between 2887 and 1914, approximately 550,000 of the almost 3
million Immigrants to Argentina stayed In Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires retained a larger proportion of its
immigrants than its new world rival, New York, possibly because of (1) undeveloped transportation facilities
within the hinterland, (2) the absence of any other important pre-existing urban centers or industry in the
hinterland, (3) a decline in the demand for labor in the hinterland as agriculture was consolidated into large
firms that replaced labor with capital, and (4) instability in the hinterland coming from wars and unfriendly
relations with the native Americans.
Politics also played a role in Buenos Aires' growth. In 1914, 95 percent of the government's revenues
came from tariffs. Scobie 119141 suggests that this heavy dependence on port related income induced the
government to keep its activities in Buenos Aires, the source of its wealth. The heavy dependence on tariffs
also created an incentive for the government to support trade, and Buenos Aires, at the expense of industry
and the hinterland. The large share of government revenues that came from with also created a stunning
array of regulations open to interpretation by local officials. Not surprisingly,this created tremendous
opportunities for bribery or coima. An estimate by Scobie puts bribery in Argentina at about 25 percent of
government revenues. This kind of personalized corruption greatly increased theneed to be close to the
19officials administering the tariffs? Like London, Buenos Aires was a center for international movements
of goodsandcapital(both human andphysical),but the concentrationof government and bureaucratic
corruption also playeda prominentrole.
6.5. Mexico City. Today
Mexico City (néeTenoebtitlan)dates from the 14th and 15th centuries, when it was built as the center for
the Aztec empire. Both the Aztecs and later the Spaniard extracted as much wealth as possible from
surrounding provinces and spent that wealth either in the city or sent it elsewhere (i.e.Spain).Despite a
limited role as a center for trade (e.g. the Manila Galleons), pre-modern Mexico was ultimately a collector
of rents. Mexico City remained a small rent-seeking capital until after World War 11. In 1900, when
Buenos Aires had already reached preeminence, Mexico City had 470,000 inhabitants. By 1940, the city
had 1.5 million people. By 1970, this number had swelled to 8.5 million (in the metropolitan area) and
today Mexico City's population has reached 18 million.
As Krugman and Livas argue, trade did not play a role in the growth of Mexico City; the city grew as
a center for manufacturing. Mexico's industrial expansion was heady in the 1945-1970 period. Industrial
real wages increased by 250 percent over this period. Manufacturing employment expanded by 2.3 million
(120percent). Thefederal district's (Mexico City and its environs) share of manufacturing employment to
grow from 25 percent in 1950 to over 40percentin 1960 and backdown to30percentin1970.
Employmentin the service sector expanded by 1.2 million (600 percent). Agricultural employment actually
declined over the 1960-1970 period.
Industrial growth was concentrated in Mexico City because the capital was the major market for most
goods as well as the major supplier (Krugman and Livas's thesis). Mexico's industrialization followed the
big push type pattern [Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 19891; urban concentration facilitated the coordination
of demand and supply. Import-substitution policies made it more necessary for consumers (especially firms
consuming intermediate inputs) to locate in Mexico city close to domestic suppliers because foreign suppliers
20were excluded from the country. Industrialgrowthalso thrived inthecapital because Mexico City was the
center for foreign capital andideas.
Political factors behind Mexico's concentration are also quite strong. Mexico has a nominally federal
government, but all real power Is concentrated In the capital. Even regional governors spend most of their
time within the capital out of fear of losing political Influence [Kandell 1988]. The Mexican government is
also particularly susceptibleto unrest in the capital. Kandell [1988] describes a typical episodeof rural-urban
migrants coming to the outskirts of the central city and beginning as squatters on the land. These migrants
then choose a political leader or cac1que who agitates against the leading party (the PR!). The government
responds by giving the migrants title to the land and providing them with some kind of minimal
infrastructure (paid for with taxes levied on the country as a whole). The migrants then become loyal
supporters of the PR!. This description of an oligarchic regime paying off local rioters with transfers seized
from remote regions of the country is highly reminiscent of Rome. It suggests that politics, as well as trade,
contributed to Mexico City's size.
VI!. Conclusion
Krugman and Llvas' (1992] hypothesis that urban concentration Is negatively related to international trade
is born out in the data. Good Internal transportation infrastructure also decreases urban concentration.
However, our time series and Instrumental variables results cast doubt on the causality in these correlations.
Trade and cities are connected, but it may be that urban concentration is causing low levels of trade, not that
low levels of trade induce concentration.
Our political results are stronger than our results on trade. They display a robust causality running from
dictatorship to urban centralization. Urban giants ultimately stem from the concentration of power in the
hands of a small cadre of agents living in the capital. This power allows the leaders to extract wealth out
of the hinterland and distribute it in the capital. Migrants come to the city because of the demand created
21by the concentrationofwealth, the desiretoinfluence the leadership, the transfersgivenby the leadership
to quell local unrest and the safy of the capital.Thispattern wastrue in Rome,50 B.C., andillstruein
manycountries today.
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271. These three authors' evidence differs from ours because of (1) their use of self-construcéed political
variables, (2) their emphasis on explicitly spatial O.e. degree of local spending or autonomy) institutions (we
look at morebasic featuresof governments), (3) their small sample size (less than forty) and restrictive time
period (Henderson usesonly 19741976).In addition to this,endogeneity problemsare much more serious
for their political variables. As one measure of government centralization, these authors use the share of local
governments In total government expenditures. This variable Is dearly a function of the distribution of
population in space. A further difftrence with out work. is that we only look at the nation's largest city.
This change was necessary to increase sample size.
2. The relationship between trade and concentration can be non-monotonic. When foods deteriorates rapidly
in transit, people must live near food supplies, as they did before the domestication of pack ninml5 (Bairoch
11988]).
3. Protectionist policies might also encourage urban concentration by promoting the growth of import-
competing activities which are dependent on essential inputs found only in the capital; central cities might
be —placesfor avoiding tarifft (New York City and Buenos Aires were both centers of smuggling);
finally,proximityto central government might beparticularly importantwhen exemptions to tariffs are being
handed out or the spoils ofprotectionare being distributed.
4.Hoselitz[1955]arguedthat there were a class of 'parasitic' cities involved In rent-seeking. Olson (1982]
emphasizes the roleofgovernment distribution policies in determining thesizeof cities. He suggests that
the capital will grow when transportation and communication networks are poorly developed in rural areas;
this, he claims 'makes it more costly and difficult for those in rural areas to mobilize political power...'.
Williamson (1991] gives an elegant description of the policies put in place transferring resources from the
hinterland to the capital. Technically, these theories are all about the nation's capital not the nation's largest
city. Since the nation's largest city is its capital in more than 90% of the countries in our sample, we have
decided to gloss over this distinction.
5. We wouldgetidentical results if the degree of dictatorship measured the size of the rents to be allocated
and the degree of instability measured theabilityof local political actors to access those rents.
6. Our results could be generalized to allow revolts starting in both areas as long as the capital has a
comparative advantage in unseating the government.
7. Both probabilities are conditional on the other change of government not occurring.
8. An urban agglomeration is an area comprising a central city or cities surrounded by an urbanized area,
and is dose to the U.S. definition of 'consolidated statistical metropolitan area.'
9. Averages were used rather than running all four observations as a panel, primarily because appropriate
panel techniques are only usable If we put some structure on how lagged values of county characteristics
change current urban concentration. We were unwilling to make the assumptions needed for that structure.
10. These standard errors do not differ greatly, however, from those obtained by OLS. We also tried
running the regressions weighting them by population.
28II. This variablewas chosen instead ofshare ofthepopulation inmanufacturing to increasesample size.
Using a pure manufacturing variable for a smaller subsampleofcountries did not change the results.
12. Our results are not particularly sensitive to the choice of the cutoff point in the Gastil index for deciding
whether a country Is a democracy or a dictatorship. More detailed examination of the data suggests a
slightlynonlinear relationshipbetween city size and political rights, where countries in the [4,5) interval
have,other thingsequal, the largest central cities. Whileour resultsdon't change if we use a non-linear
continuous dictatorship variable, we find ourdummy variableeasier to interpret. Our cutoff of3follows
Perotti (19911.
13. For a those countries that were never a colony or that became independent before 1815, we used the
1850 observation if available or the 1900 one.
14. We also used an alternative measure provided in Lee 119921, who uses the actual average tariff rate on
imported inputs, intermediate and capital goods in or around 1980. This variable (which wasavailable for
a sub-sample of 67 countries) also entered strongly positive and significantin our regressions.
15. U reached a population of approximately 24,000 around 2800 B.C. Babylon may have had as many as
300,000 inhabitants under Hammurabi in 1700 B.C. According to Bairoch, Alexandria (the largest Hellenic
city) never exceeded a population of 320,000. India and China had big population centersseveral centuries
before the common era. All of these centers were associated with extremely powerful empires. Bairoch
(19881 streises the role of international trade in supporting these cities. However, asmuch as Babylon was
a trading city, it was even more a center of taxation and tribute. Herodotusestimates that 213ofBabylon's
revenues caine from non-Assyrian provinces. Babylon's main function was as a basefur military force and
political stability, not as a center for trade.
16. Rome's population is disputed. Bairoch estimates the population at about 800,000 by the second century
A.D. based (in part) on the list of recipients of state grain (Garnsey also uses this source to get estimates
at over I million). In contrast, using structural densities as an estimation device, Russell (1985) provides us
with a lower bound of approximately 200,000 at the height of Imperial Rome. While there are problems
with any estimate, the mass of evidence (ranging from the structural expansion of Rome in this period to the
eyewitness discussions of overcrowding during the 130-50 period) suggest that Rome was growing rapidly
during the late Republic.
17. The grain distributions were not completely egalitarian. Some fee was required for thedistribution
(under the earlier Sempronian Law but not under the later Clodian Law) and slavesand others of the poor
were excluded. But the grain was essentially a dole meant to appease the politicallyactive elements of Rome
(Scullard 19591.
18. A particularly striking feature of London's growth between 1600 and 1670 is thedominance of deaths
over births. Wrigley and Schofield 119811 report that London had 600,000more burials than baptisms
between 1600 and 1675. Given a natural deficit of this magnitude, net migration to the capitalmust have
been more than 875,000 people.
19. This should be compared with a national production of 25 million kobandwith the nutritional needs
of one Japanese of one kokuperyear. This means that 2.56 million people could be fed bythe rice revenues
owed to Ieyasu alone.
20. Along with this concentration around revenues caine other governmental actionsthat increased the size
of Buenos Aires. Massive public works programs were associated with thecelebration of the loath
anniversary of Argentina's independence from Spain in 1910. Streetcar inilageincreased fourfold between1887 and 1914.There was nocorrespondingincreasepublicinvestment inthe hinterland.TABLE I
Description of the Data
City Population Share of Country a
Population
Tokyo, Japan
Five biggest main cities by 1985 population
19,037,361 15.76%
Mexico City, Mexico 16,465,487 20.97%
New York, United States 15,627,553 6.53%




Five smallestmain citiesby 1985 population
156,850 4.47%
Porto Novo, Benin 182,653 4.52%
Kigali, Rwanda 198,915 3.30%
Bujumbura, Bunandi 261,098 5.56%
Kathmandu, Nepal 277,539 1.66%
Singapore, Singapore
Five biggestmaincities by share of
country's population in 1985
2,558.000 100%
Hong Kong, HongKong 5,044,073 92.5%
Montevideo, Unsguay 1,157,450 39.36%
Buenos Aires,Argentina 10,759,29! 35.47%
Santiago, Chile 4,221,049 34.87%




Calcutta, india 10,227,890 1.34%
Kathmandu, Nepal 277,539 1.66%
Kigali, Rwanda 198,915 3.30%
Sana, Yemen 284,561 3.57%TABLE U
Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean SW. Dcv Minimum Maximum
Population
(POP)
85 30,000,000 77,000,000 1,748,250655,000,000
Main City Size
(MCIT)
85 2,489,953 3,511,807 120,404 16,900,000
Main City Growth
(MCITGR)




85 974 1,912 11 9,976
Per capita GDP In
1980 USS
(GDP)





85 0.51 0.28 0.067 0.97
Share of Trade in
GDP
(TVAL)
85 0.43 0.21 0.0 1.18
Dictatorship Dummy
(POL)
85 0.65 0.48 0 1
Revolution andCoups
(REVCOUP)
85 0.23 0.25 0 1.15
Import Duties/Imports
(IMD)




50 0.02 0.01 0.0000075 0.061
NOTh: All variable. an .va.ge. of their 1970, 197$, 1950 and 19*5 ob.avatio,. lIt 1915 observation ii missing for the
Sbszs of labor Outside of Agriculwn. The 1970 observsioe is missing (or Impoit Duties and Oovcnnad Tisaspoitation
andC zhoa Expendhuna.The data mi Land A,e. ii in thousand. of beasm. TheDictstoS.ip Dummytakes a vaijis
of Iforcowtie.with anavengeOnatil indexlarger than 3.TABLE 111
SimpleCorrelations












TVAL -0.313 -0.392 0.105 -0.2690.0650.118
(0.004) (0.000)(0.337)(0.013) (0.554)(0.28 1)
POL -0.192 -0.2170.582-0.107 -0.720-0.691-0.011
(0.077) (0.046)(0.000)(0.328) (0.000)(0.000)(0.919)
REVCOUP -0,071 -0.1060.232-0.064 -0.44!-0.358-0.1970.469
(0.517) (0.334)(0.033)(0.561) (0.000)(0.001)(0.071) (0.000)
IMD 0.309 -0.1190.416-0.100 -0.660-0.567-0.1410.460 0.350
(0.009) (0.327)(0.000)(0.408) (0.000)(0.000) (0.245) (0.000)(0.003)
TRANS -0.244 -0.353 0.252-0.288 -0.119-0.0270.395-0.016 -0.216 -0.008
(0.088) (0.012)(0.078)(0.042) (0.411)(0.852)(0.005) (0.911)(0.132)(0.960)
MflSee TabtaBlatvañabtadelinitionLSample u.ed I.that of Table tI The iigniftcanee prvbability ofthe correlation under the idI hypothesis that the ut.tSic
is rmu is ihown in parenthesis.TABLE IV
Dependent Variable: Log of Average
Population in Main CIty (1970-1985)







































Log of Average Urbanized































































Dictatorship Dummy Based on























Revolution and Coups 2.372
(0.772)
Dictatorship Dummy *
Revolution and Coups .
-2.705
(0.803)
Number of Observations 85 85 85 85 85 85
Adjusted R2 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.84
NO7E All vui.bk. are avenge, of their 1970. 1915. 1980 .nd 19*5 obsavaziona. The 19*5 obsention ia
mining for the Share or I.thor Outaide of Agriculture. The DictatoSdp Dummy take,. value of I for ooumries






























































































Dictatorship Dummy Based on





















Number ofObservations 70 70 70 50 50 50
Mjusted R3 0.770.78 0.79 0.84 0.85 0.86
Note: SeeTale IV. The 2910o4nezv.tionis mining (or Inipoit Dutia aM Oovcnund Truiapoxtstion aM Comnuiicstion
Expeadituru.TABLE VI














Log of Average Non-Urbanized 0.7 10 0.565
Population (0.146)(0.086)
Log of Average Urbanized 0.047 0.066
Population Outside the Main City (0.056)(0.042)












Share of Trade in GDP -0.361-1.017
.
(1.197)(0.857)
Dictatorship Dummy Based on 1.788 0.511
Gastil's Index ofPolitical Rights (0.901)(0.291)
Number of Observations 85 85
Adjusted Rt 0.69 0.82
85R2 of regression of -0.063 -0.02
residuals on instruments
p-value of restrictions 0.75 0.75
?V7E: SeeTableIV.In ,egttaiom (13) and (14), tMDidatoS4 Dummy and the Share of
Tradein ODPan Unted — n.dogenou..The inmn.mardaUs we u.ed an the avenge swmbcr
of,evolution. and coup.inneighboring countka, the avenge ixunbaofper capita political
aa...ainalio.ia in neighboringeount,S, * dummyvariablethat take. a vahse of Iifthe avenge
GaaSIndex ofpolitical d5M. in neighboringecwtrie.S higher than3and0cthetwiae. the
1960yak., of the dl.nie ogeneiy index, • dummy variable Us take. a value of liftS
eowty bee..,. =t after the end of Woild War II and 0 otherwin, and IS avenge
med den.ity in neighboring courSe. In regreion (14), we add twe geneated inMiutncfl. In
our lit of eortob: this axe the trued value. oasiss (torn amning a PROfIT for the
Didalonhip Dummy end a TOBFr for the Share of Tied. on all the cangemiul variablea in the
ayteni. The p-value, for the let of Ure ovetidertifying intridion. are obtained by tuaning S
re.iduala from the aecoird sage regreaaion on .11 the brurrcra. The obtained R' uwkiplied
by the .mmber of ob,e.vasiona is diatributed —'x' with) degna of freedom, when) ii S
rnsmber of Insiumeta mimi the number of intnmncd variable..TABLE VII
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NumberofObservations 85 85 85 85
Adjusted R 0.10 0.49 0.55 0.23
Note: Wbito.con,dgd dazidstd enon in ptteshStFIGURE I
POLITICS AND URBAN CONCENTRATION
STABLE DEMOCRACIES STABLE DICTATORSHIPS
Urban Concentration0.23 Urban Concentration =0.31
(0.032) (0.03)
Number of Observations24 Number ofObservations16
UNSTABLEDEMOCRACIES UNSTABLE DICTATORSHIPS
Urban Concentration0.35 UrbanConcentration =0.31
(0.07) (0.02)
NumberofObservations =6 Number of Observations=39
Urban concentration is defined as the avenge share of urbanized population living in the main city from
1970 to 1985.
Stable countries are defined as those whose average number of revolution and coupsis below theworldwide
median.
Dictatorships are countrS whose average Gastil index for the period is higher than 3.
Standard errors in parenthesis.